We present a general construction of a rational secret-sharing protocol that converts any rational secret-sharing protocol to a protocol with an expected constant-round reconstruction. Our construction can be applied to protocols for synchronous channels, and preserves a strict Nash equilibrium of the original protocol. Combining with an existing protocol, we obtain the first expected constant-round protocol that achieves a strict Nash equilibrium with the optimal coalition resilience ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1, where n is the number of players. Our construction can be extended to a construction that preserves the immunity to unexpectedly behaving players. Then, for any constant m ≥ 1, we obtain an expected constant-round protocol that achieves a Nash equilibrium with the optimal coalition resilience ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − m − 1 in the presence of m unexpectedly behaving players. The same protocol also achieves a strict Nash equilibrium with coalition resilience 1. We show that our protocol with immunity achieves the optimal coalition resilience among constant-round protocols with immunity with respect to both Nash and strict Nash equilibria.
Introduction
Much attention has been paid to the interplay between game theory and cryptography. (For surveys, see [12, 20, 5, 10, 15] .) One important research problem is to design cryptographic protocols for rational players in a game-theoretic sense. Traditionally, most cryptographic protocols have been designed for participants who are either honest or malicious. There is, however, no guarantee for non-malicious players to behave honestly in real-life situations. It is desirable that cryptographic protocols work for rational players.
Halpern and Teague [11] initiated the study of secret sharing for rational players, which is called rational secret sharing. The payoff function is characterized such that rational players prefer to learn the secret and prefer fewer players to learn the secret. Assuming this payoff function, it does not seem that conventional secret-sharing schemes work well. They showed that it is impossible to construct a protocol that terminates in a fixed number of rounds, and proposed an expected constant round protocol that is in a Nash equilibrium surviving iterated elimination of weakly dominated [14] SBC O(1/β) strict NE 1 [21] NSBC honest players 2 w.h.p. THPE NA [19] envelope VTP 6 U-IEWDS NA [2] SBC RSS of [9] O(1) IEWDS ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1 [7] P2P VRF or TDP O(1/β) strict NE n − 1 This work NSBC RSS of [7] 3 w.h.p. strict NE ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1 In the table, β is a sufficiently small constant that depends on the players' payoffs, and the actual value of β may differ in each protocol. The following abbreviations are used. SBC: simultaneous broadcast channel. NSBC: non-simultaneous broadcast channel. MPC: multiparty computation. M/M Enc: meaningful/meaningless encryption. VTP: verifiable trusted party. VRF: verifiable random functions. TDP: trapdoor permutations. IEWDS: NE that survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. U-IEWDS: strategy that uniquely survives iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies. THPE: trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
players might follow any strategy other than the prescribed one with small probability, there is no better strategy for the player than the prescribed one. Our implication shows that a strict Nash equilibrium is a relatively strong solution concept that captures the stability against any small deviations of players.
Optimal coalition resilience. Since a plain Nash equilibrium only guarantees the stability against deviations by a single player, a coalition-resilient Nash equilibrium, in which multiple players may deviate, is studied [1, 13, 2, 7] . Informally, a (strict) Nash equilibrium is called r-resilient if it is a (strict) Nash equilibrium even if deviations by a coalition of r players are considered. Our construction preserves the coalition resilience of the underlying sub-protocol. In our construction, if the sub-protocol achieves an r-resilient strict Nash equilibrium for any r ≤ ⌈ achieves a strict Nash equilibrium in non-simultaneous channels.
Immunity to unexpectedly behaving players. Furthermore, we also provide a general construction that preserves the immunity to "unexpectedly behaving" (or malicious) players. Informally, a protocol is called m-immune if no unexpected behavior of m players affects the payoffs of the other players. The immunity has been studied in [1, 17] , and guarantees certain robustness of protocols. In particular, the immunity is a desirable property for protocols conducted by "rational" players since such protocols rely on the rationality of players, but it seems difficult to understand the rationality of every player precisely. When a protocol does not have any immunity, the protocol may not work well at all even if only a single player behaves unexpectedly. Indeed, several existing protocols including our protocol described above do not work in the presence of such a player.
For any constant m, we give a non-constant round protocol that achieves an (n−m−1)-resilient Nash equilibrium with m-immunity. The protocol is a variant of the protocol of [7] . By applying our general construction to this protocol, we obtain a constant-round protocol that achieves an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − m − 1)-resilient Nash equilibrium with m-immunity. The same protocol also achieves a 1-resilient strict Nash equilibrium. Our general construction with immunity requires symmetric-key encryption and pseudorandom functions, and thus fits the computational setting.
We also discuss the optimality of our protocols with immunity regarding the coalition resilience. We show that constant-round protocols with m-immunity cannot achieve an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − m)-resilient Nash equilibrium, and protocols with immunity cannot achieve a 2-resilient strict Nash equilibrium. Thus, our protocol with immunity achieves an optimal coalition resilience with respect to both Nash and strict Nash equilibrium.
Other interesting features. In the protocols obtained by our construction, the players can learn the secret without using the shares of the sub-protocol with high probability. As far as we know, this property is novel among rational secret-sharing protocols. In this sense, our protocol is not obtained by a simple combination of the protocols of [2] and [7] . Because of this property, even if the reconstruction of the sub-protocol needs heavy computation, our construction converts such a protocol to a protocol with efficient reconstruction. In the resulting protocol, the shares of the sub-protocol are used as a "hedge" against the failure in the previous rounds. We believe that this idea of our construction could be applied to other rational cryptographic protocols.
Additionally, our construction can employ any protocol achieving a strict Nash equilibrium in a black-box manner, while the existing protocols [1, 2] that need sub-protocols require a certain type of protocols as a sub-protocol.
Our Approach
We describe the idea of our general construction. The dealer chooses conventional secret-sharing schemes S 1 and S 2 , and a rational secret-sharing protocol S 3 . The secret is shared by S 1 and S 3 , but with small probability, the secret for S 1 is fake. The information on whether the secret of S 1 is real or fake is shared by S 2 . In the reconstruction, first, players are requested to reveal the shares of S 1 , and then proceed to the next round only if all the players have honestly revealed the shares. In the first round, all the players have an incentive to reveal their shares. Let t 1 be the threshold of the secret sharing scheme S 1 . Then, the t 1 -th sender in this round can reconstruct the secret by using her own share. Nevertheless, she will reveal her share since the secret may be fake, and if she did not reveal, the protocol halts along with the possibility that the secret is fake. The small probability that the secret is fake poses a "threat" to players so as to reveal their shares in the first round. In the second round, all the players are requested to reveal the shares of S 2 , and then proceed to the next round only if all the players have honestly revealed the shares and the reconstructed secret is fake. Let t 2 be the threshold of the secret sharing scheme S 2 . Then, the t 2 -th sender in this round will learn whether the secret is real or fake by using her own share. If the secret is fake, she reveals her share since if not, the protocol does not proceed to the next round and she cannot learn the secret. If the secret is real, then she has no incentive to participate in the protocol, and thus she may not reveal her share, but this action signals to the other players that the secret is real. Therefore, every player can recognize that the reconstructed secret in the previous round is real. If no player deviates in the first two rounds and the reconstructed secret is fake, all the players are guaranteed to learn the secret eventually by S 3 . The idea of using the secret sharing S 2 as the signal indicating whether a reconstructed secret of S 1 is real or fake is similar to the idea used in [7] for achieving a strict Nash equilibrium for non-simultaneous channels.
As in [7] , our protocol assumes that players have no auxiliary information about the secret. Although this assumption may be inevitable for constructing fair protocols in the non-simultaneous channels [2] , we believe that there are settings in which this assumption is valid and that studying this case could lead to the understanding of rational cryptographic protocols. If simultaneous channels are assumed, our protocol works without this assumption.
Related Work
Constant-round reconstruction for rational secret sharing was achieved by Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern [1] , Micali and shelat [19] , Ong, Parkes, Rosen, and Vadhan [21] , and Asharov and Lindell [2] . The protocols in [1, 2] achieve a Nash equilibrium with a coalition resilience of ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1, and need a certain type of rational secret-sharing protocol such as [9, 1, 13, 14, 7] as a sub-protocol. However, their protocols assume a simultaneous broadcast channel and need to perform the subprotocol to reconstruct the secret several times. The protocol of [19] achieves a strong solution concept. However, their protocol requires a stronger communication channel than the others. The protocol of [21] is quite efficient with respect to both round complexity and computational cost with a weaker communication channel. However, a sufficient number of honest players are assumed to exist. Regarding the solution concept, the protocol in [21] does not satisfy a strict Nash equilibrium.
A black-box construction in the literature of rational cryptography has appeared in the study on a novel framework called rational protocol design [8] , where designing protocols itself is modeled as a game between a protocol designer and an attacker. While Garay et al. [8] show general composition theorems in their framework, as far as we know, black-box constructions have not appeared in the literature of rational secret sharing.
Paper Organization
In Section 2, we define the problem of rational secret sharing, and define game-theoretic notions used in this work. Cryptographic primitives used in our protocols are given in Section 3. Our protocols are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we discuss the optimality of our protocols with immunity regarding the coalition resilience. In Section 6, we show that a strict Nash equilibrium implies the stability with respect to trembles.
Rational Secret Sharing

Secret-Sharing Scheme
A t-out-of-n secret-sharing scheme consists of two phases: the sharing phase and the reconstruction phase. In the sharing phase, the dealer holds the secret and distributes shares of the secret to n parties called players. In the reconstruction phase, the players reconstruct the secret from their shares. We consider the two requirements, correctness and secrecy. The correctness guarantees that every subset of t * ≥ t players can reconstruct the secret if they perform the reconstruction phase honestly. The secrecy guarantees that no subset of t * < t players can learn the secret beyond what can be learned from the publicly available information.
Secret-Sharing Reconstruction Game
We assume that the players are rational. In secret-sharing schemes, the reconstruction phase can be considered as a game for the players. Therefore, we see the reconstruction protocol as a pair of a game and a prescribed strategy for the game. The goal is to design a protocol that will result in the desired outcome: all the participants reconstruct the secret. We say a (rational) secret-sharing protocol Π is t-out-of-n if, in addition to the t-out-of-n property of secret sharing, the shares are distributed to n players, and the reconstruction protocol can be performed in the presence of t * ≥ t players. We say that Π is a t-out-of-n secret-sharing "protocol" when we see it as rational secret-sharing, and that Π is a t-out-of-n secret-sharing "scheme" when we see it as a conventional secret-sharing scheme.
Following [7] , we model a reconstruction game in a way such that a secret s is chosen uniformly at random from the domain of secrets, and every player finally outputs some value, which the player wants to be the same as the secret s. The advantages of modeling a game in this way are discussed in [7] . Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players in the protocol. The outcome of the game is denoted
where o i is a random variable that equals 1 if the output of player i is s, and 0 otherwise. The payoff of each player is determined by the outcome of the game.
The tuple of strategies σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) is called a strategy profile for the game, where σ i corresponds to the strategy for player i. Let C be a subset of N . We define σ C to be the tuple of strategies σ i for i ∈ C. Following the game-theoretic notation, we define σ −i = (σ 1 , . . . , σ i−1 , σ i+1 , . . . , σ n ), and σ −C = σ N \C . For two strategy profiles σ and
. . , σ n ) for i ∈ N , and write (σ ′ C , σ −C ) as the strategy profile in which the strategy of player i is σ ′ i if i ∈ C and σ i otherwise. If all actions specified in each σ i can be computed by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine, the strategy profile σ is called PPT . Let u i (σ) denote the expected payoff of player i when the players follow a strategy profile σ.
Game-Theoretic Notions
For a secret-sharing protocol Π, if the prescribed strategy σ of the reconstruction protocol Π achieves a game-theoretic concept, say A, in the reconstruction game, we say that Π induces A.
The definitions of computational Nash equilibrium, computational strict Nash equilibrium, stability with respect to trembles, and their extension to coalition resilience follow the definitions of [7] . Regarding the immunity to malicious players, we provide a computational definition which is an extension of the information-theoretic definition of [1] . Hereafter, we use k as the security parameter of cryptographic primitives. We say a function ϵ : N → R is negligible if for every
is not negligible.
Definition 1 (Computational Nash equilibrium).
A PPT strategy profile σ is a computational Nash equilibrium if for any i ∈ N and any PPT strategy
To define a strict Nash equilibrium, we use the notion of equivalent play, which was introduced in [7] . Let σ be a prescribed strategy profile and σ ′ i a strategy for player i. Define the view of player i in the game to include the information given by the dealer to player i, the random coin of player i, and all the messages received from player j ̸ = i, but not including any messages from player j after player i writes to her (write-once) output tape. We say the strategy σ ′ i yields equivalent play with respect to σ, denoted by σ ′ i ∈ eq σ, if, given the views of all the players j ̸ = i in which they follow σ −i and player i follows either σ i or σ ′ i , no PPT machine can distinguish whether player i follows
(See [7] for the detailed definition.) We write σ ′ i ̸ ∈ eq σ if σ ′ i does not yield equivalent play with respect to σ.
A strict Nash equilibrium guarantees that if some player deviates from the prescribed protocol, then the payoff of the player decreases by some noticeable amount.
Definition 2 (Computational strict Nash equilibrium).
A PPT strategy profile σ is a computational strict Nash equilibrium if (1) σ is a computational Nash equilibrium; and (2) for any i ∈ N and any PPT strategy
The above definitions consider deviations by a single player. We also consider deviations of a coalition of players. A coalition is a subset of the players N . We consider a coalition is a set of players who may be coordinated by some single party. Therefore, we assume that each coalition has one payoff function. Let C ⊂ N be a coalition and u C (·) the payoff function of C.
Definition 3 (Coalition resilience).
A PPT strategy profile σ is an r-resilient computational Nash equilibrium if for any C ⊂ N with |C| ≤ r and any PPT strategy
We also define the coalition-resilient variant of strict Nash equilibrium. For C ⊂ N , we write
Definition 4.
A PPT strategy profile σ is an r-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium if (1) σ is an r-resilient computational Nash equilibrium; and (2) for any C ⊂ N with |C| ≤ r and any
We introduce the notion of immunity to unexpectedly behaving players. The immunity guarantees that even if some players behave unexpectedly (or maliciously) in the game, the behavior does not affect the payoffs of the other players. The (r, m)-robustness guarantees that even if at most m players behave maliciously, the strategy is still an r-resilient Nash equilibrium, and that the malicious behavior does not affect the payoffs of the other players. Note that an (r, m)-robustness implies both an r-resilient Nash equilibrium and m-immunity. This is because an r-resilient Nash equilibrium is a special case of the first condition that m = 0, and m-immunity appears as the second condition. We can also define an (r, m)-robust computational strict Nash equilibrium analogously.
Finally, we present the notion of the stability with respect to trembles defined in [7] . Intuitively, the stability with respect to trembles guarantees that even if a player believes that other players might follow any strategy other than the prescribed one with small probability, there is no better strategy for the player than the prescribed one. We say a PPT strategy profile ρ −i is δ-close to σ −i if ρ −i takes σ −i with probability 1 − δ and an arbitrary PPT strategy σ ′ −i with probability δ.
Definition 7 (Stability with respect to trembles).
A PPT strategy profile σ is an r-resilient computational Nash equilibrium that is stable with respect to trembles if 1. σ is an r-resilient computational Nash equilibrium; 2. There is a noticeable function δ(·) such that for any C ⊂ N with |C| ≤ r, any PPT strategy profile ρ −C that is δ-close to σ −C , and any PPT strategy ρ C , there exists a PPT strategy
Payoff Functions of Players
The payoff function of players in reconstruction games follows the previous studies. First, players prefer to learn the secret. Second, players prefer fewer players to learn the secret. The payoffs for a secret-sharing reconstruction game depend only on the outcome of the game. We write u i (o) as the payoff of player i for the outcome o. For two outcomes o and o ′ , we assume that
. In our analysis, we need the following values for u i (o):
1. U + is the payoff when player i learns the secret and no other player does. 2. U is the payoff when all the players in the reconstruction game learn the secret. 3. U − is the maximum payoff when player i does not learn the secret.
It should hold that U + ≥ U > U − . We assume that there is a noticeable function δ 1 (·) such that
where k is the security parameter. We define
where S is the domain of secrets in the secret-sharing protocol. The value U random is the payoff of a player who outputs a random guess for the secret assuming that the other parties halt without any output or with the wrong outputs. We also assume that there is a noticeable function δ 2 (·) such that U ≥ U random + δ 2 (k). This inequality means that players have an incentive to perform the reconstruction protocol.
Regarding the payoff of coalitions, we also follow the formalization of [7] . We assume the coalition C outputs a single value in a game. The outcome of a game with the coalition C consists of the outcome o i of player i ∈ N \ C and the outcome o C of the coalition C. The outcome o C takes 1 if C outputs the secret, and 0 otherwise. Let u C (o) denote the payoff of the coalition C for the outcome o of the game with the coalition C. Then, we define three values for u C (o):
1. U + is the payoff when C learns the secret and no player outside C does. 2. U is the payoff when all the players in the reconstruction game learn the secret. 3. U − is the maximum payoff when C does not learn the secret.
It should hold that U + ≥ U > U − . We also define U random as in the case of a single deviation. Then, we assume that there are noticeable functions δ 3 (·) and
Communication Channels
We assume that players can use only a synchronous but non-simultaneous broadcast channel [13, 14] . With this channel, the protocol proceeds in rounds, and each round consists of n sub-rounds for each player, where n is the number of players in the protocol. In each sub-round, only a single player can send a message. We assume that if a player does not send any message (within some predetermined time), the other players will receive the special symbol ⊥ from her.
Cryptographic Primitives
We give definitions of cryptographic primitives used in our protocols.
Authenticated Secret-Sharing Scheme
An authenticated secret-sharing scheme is a secret-sharing scheme with authentication, which can be obtained by a standard technique [26, 23] . The dealer generates shares (
Players can reconstruct the secret if a sufficient number of σ i are collected. Each player i can verify whether a collected share (σ j , π j ) is valid or not by using v i .
Definition 8. An m-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms
• Security: For any s, s ′ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , and M ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |M | < m, two sets of random variables {σ i } i∈M and {σ ′ i } i∈M are identically distributed, where
• Authenticity: For any s ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and algorithm A,
, and ϵ(·) is a negligible function.
Symmetric-Key Encryption Scheme
We need a symmetric-key encryption scheme with a standard security, called security against chosen-plaintext attacks. Since we require the security for unbounded polynomially many messages, we consider a computational security, and encryption algorithms need to be probabilistic. An encryption scheme with this security can be constructed from any one-way function.
Definition 9. For a polynomial ℓ(·)
, an ℓ-bit symmetric-key encryption scheme is a tuple Π = (GenSKE, Enc, Dec) of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms such that
• Correctness:
• Security: For any polynomial-time oracle algorithm A = (A 1 , A 2 ), and polynomial-time
where
Output θ 2 .
Pseudorandom Function
A pseudorandom functions is a function that looks like a random function, and can be constructed from any one-way function.
Definition 10. A family of functions
• Easy to compute: For any sk ∈ {0, 1} * and x ∈ {0, 1} |sk| , f sk (x) can be computed by a polynomial-time algorithm.
• Pseudorandomness: For any probabilistic polynomial-time oracle algorithm D, there is a negligible function ϵ(·) such that for all n ∈ N,
where sk ∈ {0, 1} k is chosen uniformly at random, and F is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all functions f : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k .
Verifiable Random Function
A verifiable random function is a pseudorandom function with verifiability, which was introduced by Micali, Rabin, and Vadhan [18] . We need a verifiable random function with unique proofs. The constructions for such stronger verifiable random functions were provided in [4] and [6] .
Definition 11.
A verifiable random function is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (GenVRF, Eval, Prove, VerVRF) such that
• Verifiability: There does not exist a tuple
• Pseudorandomness: Eval is pseudorandom.
Our Protocols
For the simplicity of the explanation, we present the n-out-of-n protocol in Section 4.1. A general t-out-of-n protocol is presented in Appendix A.1 as a generalization of the n-out-of-n protocol. In Section 4.2, we present a construction of protocols with immunity to malicious players.
The n-out-of-n Protocol
Our protocol proceeds as described in Section 1.2. Specifically, we use (⌊ n 2 ⌋ + 1)-out-of-n and ⌈ n 2 ⌉-out-of-n secret sharing schemes as S 1 and S 2 , respectively.
We give a sketch of the proof that our protocol achieves a strict Nash equilibrium. In our protocol, any deviation from the protocol decreases the payoff of players as long as coalitions of size at most ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1 are considered. Note that, in the analysis of the strict Nash equilibrium, we can assume that the players outside a coalition follow the prescribed strategy. In the first round, since the number of players in the coalition is at most ⌈
⌋+1 valid shares will be revealed. Thus, all the players can learn the secret of S 1 regardless of the actions of the coalition. If some player in the coalition revealed an invalid share in the first round, the players will not proceed to the next round (or equivalently, the protocol will halt) along with the possibility that the reconstructed secret is fake, which decreases the payoff. In the second round, the first ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1 players (outside the coalition), who do not know whether the reconstructed secret is real or fake, will reveal a valid share. This is because if any invalid share is revealed, the players will not proceed to the third round and thus there remains the possibility that the real secret cannot be reconstructed. After receiving the ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1 shares, the rest of players can verify that the secret is real or fake by using her own share. If the secret is fake, the rest of players also reveal their valid shares in order to go to the next round for reconstructing the real secret using the shares of S 3 . If the secret is real, the rest of players may not reveal their valid shares, but this signals to the other players that the secret is real, and thus all the players can learn the secret. However, to achieve a strict Nash equilibrium, in which any deviation implies the decrease of the payoff, we cannot allow any deviation when all the players can learn the secret. Thus, in the protocol, we allow players to be silent (or reveal invalid shares) in this round if the reconstructed secret is real. This implies that in this round deviations occur only when the reconstructed secret is fake.
To achieve an n-out-of-n property, we employ the masking technique used in [2] at the cost of one additional round in the reconstruction phase. In the sharing phase, the dealer chooses µ uniformly at random and masks the secret s by taking µ ⊕ s. Then the above protocol is performed in which µ ⊕ s is considered as the secret. The mask µ is shared by a conventional n-out-of-n secret-sharing scheme S 0 . In the reconstruction phase, players first are requested to reveal their shares of S 0 to reconstruct µ. If some player deviates, the protocol halts and no player can learn the secret. Note that if the n-out-of-n property is not required, namely, the only requirement is that the secret can be reconstructed by rational players, then the above additional round can be eliminated.
In order to check the validity of the received shares, we use authenticated secret-sharing to share the secret. Thus, players can generate invalid shares only with a negligible probability.
We give a formal description of our protocol. The protocol employs an n-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 0 , an (⌊ n 2 ⌋ + 1)-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 1 , an ⌈ n 2 ⌉-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 2 , and an n-out-of-n rational secret-sharing protocol S 3 . Note that, in the protocol below, we can choose the probability α to be k −c for any constant c, where k is the security parameter.
Sharing phase. To share a secret s ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , the dealer performs the following:
• Choose µ ∈ {0, 1} ℓ uniformly at random, and generate shares (w 1 , . . . , w n ) of S 0 with the secret µ.
• Set s ′ = { µ ⊕ s with probability 1 − α, fake with probability α, , where fake ∈ {0, 1} ℓ is chosen uniformly at random, and generate shares (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of S 1 with the secret s ′ .
• Set s ′′ = 1 if s ′ = µ ⊕ s in the previous step, and s ′′ = 0 otherwise, and generate shares (y 1 , . . . , y n ) of S 2 with the secret s ′′ .
• Generate shares (z 1 , . . . , z n ) of S 3 with the secret s.
Reconstruction phase. After all the players received the shares, the players perform the following:
• For all i ∈ N (in any order), send w i .
After all the players broadcasted their messages, if all the shares are valid, reconstruct µ from (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and go to the next round. Otherwise, halt and output a random string in {0, 1} ℓ .
• For all i ∈ N (in any order), send x i .
-After all the players broadcasted their messages, set N * to be the set of players j ∈ N who sent the valid share. If |N * | ≥ ⌊ • Perform the reconstruction protocol of S 3 by using z i to reconstruct s.
Then, halt and output s.
We have the following theorem. Proof: Note that α can be chosen to be k −c for any constant c. The condition n ≥ 3 comes from the fact that we need a non-trivial coalition-resilient Nash equilibrium for S 3 , namely, ⌈
First, we claim that our protocol has the n-out-of-n property. Since the secret s is masked by µ, which is shared by the n-out-of-n secret-sharing S 0 , at most n − 1 shares of {w i } reveal no information on s. Also, at most n − 1 shares of {z i } reveal no information on s since each z i is a share of the n-out-of-n secret sharing S 3 . The correctness of the protocol follows from the correctness of the underlying schemes S 0 , S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 . If all the n players follow the protocol, they can learn the secret in the third round with probability 1 − α, and in the later rounds with probability α. Note that, although we allow players to take any action when the reconstructed secret is real in the third round, this does not affect the fact that the players can learn the secret in the third round if they follow the protocol. Therefore, the secret is reconstructed in three rounds with probability 1 − α = 1 − k −c , and the expected number of rounds for reconstruction is
Next, we prove that the protocol induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1)-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium. In the analysis, we assume that, when a player is requested to send a share of authenticated secret-sharing schemes, all the actions that the player can take are sending the valid share and being silent. This is because sending an invalid share is regarded as being silent and the probability of successfully generating another valid share is negligible, which follows from the authenticity of authenticated secret-sharing schemes.
Let C ⊂ N be any coalition with |C| ≤ ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1. Let σ be the prescribed strategy of the protocol. Then it follows from the correctness of the protocol that u C (σ) = U . First, we show that σ is a computational Nash equilibrium. Namely, for any strategy σ ′ C of C, we show that
Note that, in evaluating the value of u C (σ ′ C , σ −C ), we can assume that the players in N \ C follow the prescribed strategy σ. In the first round, if some player in C is silent, then the players in N \ C do not proceed to the later rounds. The shares {w i } i∈N only contain the information on µ. Also, the shares {(x i , y i , z i )} i∈C reveal no information on s ′ or s since the thresholds of S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 are strictly greater than ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1 ≥ |C|. Thus, the coalition C cannot learn the secret s. Therefore, the payoff of C is at most max{U − , U random }, which is noticeably less than U .
In the second round, every player in N can reconstruct s ′ regardless of the strategy of C because the players in N \ C reveal their valid shares, and thus the number of valid shares revealed is at
, which is at least the threshold ⌊ n 2 ⌋ + 1 of S 1 . Note that, at this point, the coalition C does not learn whether s ′ is real or fake. This is because s and s ′ are indistinguishable since both s and s ′ are distributed uniformly at random, and s ′′ is shared by ⌈ n 2 ⌉-out-of-n secret sharing. If some player in C is silent in the second round, then the players in N \ C do not proceed to the later rounds, and thus the coalition C cannot learn whether s ′ is real or fake. Still, the coalition C cannot learn the secret s from {z i } i∈C . Therefore, since s ′ = fake with probability α, the expected payoff of
In the third round, if some player in C is deviated from the protocol, which means that s ′′ = 0, namely, s ′ = fake , the players in N \ C do not proceed to the later rounds. Then, the coalition C cannot learn the secret s since the only way to learn s is to use {z i } i∈C , but they are the shares of the n-out-of-n secret sharing S 3 . Therefore, the payoff of C is u C (σ ′ C , σ −C ) ≤ max{U − , U random }, which is noticeably less than U .
If no player in C has deviated in the first three rounds and s ′ = fake, the players will go to the reconstruction protocol of S 3 . Since S 3 induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1)-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium, the expected payoff of C is at most U + ϵ(k) for a negligible function ϵ(·) if players in C deviated from the protocol of S 3 .
Therefore, in any case, the expected payoff is u C (σ ′ C , σ −C ) ≤ U + ϵ(k) for any strategy σ ′ C of C, and thus the protocol induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1)-resilient computational Nash equilibrium. To complete the proof of the computational strict Nash equilibrium, we need to show that for any strategy
The proof follows from the above analysis along with the fact that in the first three rounds, each player has a unique valid share she can send. If the strategy σ ′ C / ∈ eq σ is such that players in C deviate from the protocol in the first three rounds, then it follows from the above analysis that
If σ ′ C is such that players in C follow the protocol in the first three rounds, but deviate in the fourth or later rounds, since S 3 induces a strict Nash equilibrium, we have that u C (σ ′ C , σ −C ) ≤ U − k −c ′ for some constant c ′ . Therefore, the protocol induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1)-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium.
Note that our protocol can use an information-theoretic rational secret-sharing as a sub-protocol. Then, the resulting protocol induces an information-theoretic strict Nash equilibrium if the subprotocol induces a strict Nash equilibrium.
A general t-out-of-n protocol for 3 ≤ t ≤ n is constructed as a simple generalization of the n-out-of-n protocol.
The Protocols with Immunity
We provide a general construction of a constant-round secret-sharing protocol that preserves both (strict) Nash equilibria and immunity of underlying protocols. To have the immunity, the protocol must proceed even if some players behave arbitrarily. At the same time, to achieve a strict Nash equilibrium, if some player deviated in the protocol, the payoff of the player must decrease.
The idea for achieving this goal is to have the protocol satisfy the property that if some player deviated in the protocol, the player cannot proceed to the later rounds. We implement it by symmetric-key encryption. If player i deviated, then in the later rounds the other players will broadcast their messages that are encrypted using symmetric-key encryption with a secret key player i does not have. Thereby, since the encrypted messages reveal no information to player i, player i is essentially excluded from the protocol. More concretely, the dealer generates a secret key sk SKE i for each player i. The set of keys {sk SKE j } j∈N \{i} is included in the share of player i. If the other players detected a deviation of player i, they will encrypt messages by symmetric-key encryption with the key sk SKE i in the later rounds. In a strict Nash equilibrium, if some player deviated from the prescribed strategy, the payoff of the player must decrease by some noticeable amount. However, if we allow players to sample random strings, it is difficult to show that a subtle deviation from the protocol (e.g., sampling from a high-entropy distribution instead of a uniform one) decreases the payoff. In our construction, we need secure symmetric-key encryption for unbounded polynomially many messages, which requires sampling random strings. To circumvent this problem, we use a pseudorandom function f for generating random strings. When player i deviated, the other players can use f sk (r) as a random string at round r if the secret key sk is not known to player i. This is because the string f sk (r) is pseudorandom for players who do not know the secret key sk. More concretely, the dealer generates secret keys sk PRF is not known, messages are securely exchanged among the players j ∈ N with j ̸ = i without sampling random strings.
In the presence of an unexpectedly behaving player, if the shares of players have the standard n-out-of-n property that guarantees that any n − 1 shares leak no information on the secret, then the players cannot reconstruct the secret if the unexpectedly behaving player does nothing in the protocol. Therefore, in the presence of m unexpectedly behaving players, we require the (n − m)-out-of-n property for a secret-sharing protocol instead of the n-out-of-n property.
We construct a constant-round protocol with 1-immunity based on any protocol with 1-immunity. Our protocol employs a symmetric-key encryption scheme Π = (GenSKE, Enc, Dec), a family of pseudorandom functions F = {f sk : {0, 1} |sk| → {0, 1} |sk| } sk∈{0,1} * , an (n − 1)-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 0 , an (⌊ n 2 ⌋ + 1)-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 1 , an ⌈ n 2 ⌉-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 2 , and an (n − 1)-out-of-n rational secretsharing protocol S 3 .
Sharing phase
To share a secret s ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , the dealer performs the following:
• Choose sk PRF i,j ∈ {0, 1} k uniformly at random for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N \ {i}, and set
Reconstruction phase
After all the players received the shares, the players perform the following:
-After all the players broadcasted their messages, set N * to be the set of players j ∈ N who sent the valid share. reconstruct µ from (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and go to the next round. Otherwise, halt and output a random string in {0, 1} ℓ .
• For all i ∈ N (in any order), if
-After all the players broadcasted their messages, if |N * | ̸ = n, then decrypt the received ciphertexts using the secret key sk SKE • For all i ∈ N * (in any order), if • If |N * | = n, perform the reconstruction protocol of S 3 by using z i to reconstruct s. Otherwise, perform the reconstruction protocol of S 3 in which player i ′ / ∈ N * deviates before starting the protocol, and at each round r, send Proof: By almost the same argument as the proof of Theorem 1, we can show the correctness and the (n − 1)-out-of-n property in the presence of a single unexpectedly behaving player We prove that the protocol induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 2, 1)-robust computational Nash equilibrium if S 3 induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 2, 1)-robust computational Nash equilibrium. Let σ be the prescribed strategy of the protocol. To prove the second condition of the robustness, namely, 1-immunity, we need to show that for any i ∈ N , any PPT strategy σ ′ i , and j ∈ N \ {i}, we have that a negligible function ϵ(·) . Since the protocol satisfies the correctness, u j (σ) = U . It is not difficult to see that, since S 3 induces 1-immunity, the protocol does not halt even if player i takes any PPT strategy σ ′ i in the protocol. Thus, we have that u j (σ −i , σ ′ i ) = U , which proves 1-immunity of the protocol.
To prove the first condition of the robustness, we show that when player i * takes an arbitrary PPT strategy ρ i * , the payoff of any coalition C ⊆ N of size at most ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 2 does not increase under the assumption that the players in N \ (C ∪ {i * }) follow the protocol. Namely, we show that for any PPT strategy ρ i * of player i * and any PPT strategy σ ′ C of the coalition C, we have that
Without loss of generality, we assume that ρ i * and σ ′ C are deterministic strategies. Since the protocol induces 1-immunity, the payoff u C (σ −i * , ρ i * ) is equal to either U or the payoff when all the players in N except player i * learn the secret. Hence, u C (σ −i * , ρ i * ) ≥ U from the definition of the payoff function. We will evaluate the value of
only when at least two players in C ∪ {i * } deviate from the protocol in the strategy profile (σ N ⋆ , σ ′ C , ρ i * ). Let i 1 and i 2 be the first and the second player in C ∪ {i * } who deviates from the protocol. We consider the following four cases: (1) player i 2 deviates in the first round; (2) player i 2 does not deviate in the first round, but in the second round; (3) player i 2 does not deviate in the first two rounds, but in the third round; (4) player i 2 does not deviate in the first three rounds, but in the fourth or later rounds; We will show that the payoff
, and U C = u C (σ −i * , ρ i * ). In case (1), the players in N ⋆ do not proceed to the second or later rounds. The shares {w i } i∈N only contain the information on µ. Also, even if the coalition C could obtain the share of player i * , the shares {(x i , y i , z i )} i∈C∪{i * } reveal no information on s ′ or s since the thresholds of S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 are strictly greater than ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 1 ≥ |C ∪ {i * }|. Thus, the coalition C cannot learn the secret s, and the payoff of C is at most max{U − , U random }, which is noticeably less than U .
In case (2), the players in N ⋆ do not proceed to the third or later rounds. However, every player in N (or N \ {i 1 } if player i 1 has deviated in the first round) can reconstruct s ′ since the players in N ⋆ reveal their valid shares, and thus the number of valid shares revealed is at least
, which is at least the threshold of S 1 . Even if the coalition C could obtain the share of player i * , C cannot learn the secret s from {z i } i∈C∪{i * } . Therefore, since s ′ = fake with probability α, the expected payoff of C is at most
In case (3), the players in N ⋆ do not proceed to the fourth or later rounds. The fact that player i 2 deviated in the third round implies that s ′ = fake. Then the coalition C cannot learn s since the only way to learn s is to use {z i } i∈C∪{i * } , but they are the shares of the (n − 1)-out-of-n secret sharing S 3 . Therefore, the payoff of C is at most max{U − , U random }, which is noticeably less than U .
In case (4), the players in N (or N \ {i 1 } if player i 1 has deviated in the first three rounds) proceed to the fourth or later rounds, which is the reconstruction protocol of S 3 . Since S 3 induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉−2)-resilient computational Nash equilibrium, the expected payoff of C is at most U C +ϵ(k) for a negligible function ϵ(·).
In any case, we have shown that the expected payoff of
Thus the protocol induces an (⌈ n 2 ⌉ − 2, 1)-robust computational Nash equilibrium.
Next we prove that the protocol induces a 1-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium if S 3 induces a 1-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium. Since we have shown in the above that the protocol induces a 1-resilient computational Nash equilibrium, we need to show that for any strategy σ ′ i of player i such that
for a constant c. First, we give an intuitive argument for this fact. If player i deviates in the first round, she cannot understand the messages broadcasted by the other players in the later rounds since they are encrypted by symmetric-key encryption with a key she does not know. Since the other n − 1 players can reconstruct the secret s, the payoff u i (σ ′ i , σ −i ) is at most max{U − , U random }, which is noticeably less than U . If player i deviated in the second round, although she can reconstruct s ′ , she cannot understand the messages broadcasted by the other players in the later rounds. Since s ′ is fake with probability α, the payoff
which is noticeably less than U . If player i deviated in the third round, which implies that s ′ is fake, player i need to participate in the reconstruction protocol of S 3 to reconstruct s. However, player i cannot understand the messages exchanged in the fourth or later rounds since they are encrypted by symmetric-key encryption. Thus, the payoff u i (σ ′ i , σ −i ) is at most max{U − , U random }, which is noticeably less than U . If player i deviated in the fourth or later rounds, since S 3 induces a 1-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium, the payoff u i (σ ′ i , σ −i ) is noticeably less than U . In any case, the deviation of player i decreases her payoff by a noticeable amount. This implies that the protocol induces a 1-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium. Now we give a formal proof of the above argument. Although we prove only for the case that player i deviates in the first round, we can prove the other cases similarly.
Claim 1. If a strategy σ ′ i of player i is such that player i deviates in the first round, then
u i (σ ′ i , σ −i ) ≤ u i (σ) − k −c for a constant c.
Proof:
It is sufficient to show that if the probability that player i obtains the secret when playing (σ ′ i , σ −i ) is not negligible, then the security of either the pseudorandom function (PRF) or the symmetric encryption scheme (SKE) is broken.
Let consider two experiments E 1 and E 2 . The first one E 1 is the experiment induced by playing the protocol with a strategy profile (σ ′ i , σ −i ). The second one E 2 is the same as the first one except that a truly random function is used instead of PRF. Let E * be the event that player i obtains the secret. We show that | Pr[E * |E 1 ] − Pr[E * |E 2 ]| is negligible. Both in E 1 and E 2 , messages in the second and later rounds are encrypted by SKE using the secret key sk SKE i , which is distributed for the players other than i. In E 1 , a message from player j at round r is encrypted by using f sk PRF i,j (r) as random bits. Note that the key sk PRF i,j is distributed to all the players other than i. Suppose for contradiction that | Pr[E * |E 1 ] − Pr[E * |E 2 ]| is not negligible. Then, consider an adversary A for PRF such that A simulates the experiments E 1 or E 2 . Since A is given an oracle access, which is either the PRF oracle or a random function oracle, A can simulates E 1 or E 2 by using the outputs of the oracle as the random bits for encryption. Thus, by checking whether player i can obtain the secret, A can distinguish the PRF oracle from the random function oracle by a non-negligible probability, which means that A breaks the security of PRF, a contradiction.
Next, consider the experiment E 3 that is the same as E 2 except that the output of the random function is replaced with truly random bits. Since, in E 2 , each player j ∈ N \ {i} uses the random function only once per round, the sequence of all the outputs of the random function in E 2 is equivalent to truly random bits. Therefore, we have that
Finally, we consider the experiment E 4 that is the same as E 3 except that the messages that are encrypted by SKE and broadcasted are replaced with random messages. Then, we show that 34 by choosing two message such that the first one is the j-th message in E 3 , and the other one is a random message, and using the given ciphertext and the oracle access to the encryption algorithm.
34 ]| is not negligible, B can break the security of SKE by checking whether player i can obtain the secret, which is a contradiction.
In E 4 , all the messages that are encrypted by SKE and broadcasted are random messages. Thus, player i can learn nothing about the secret from these messages, and we have that Pr[E * |E 4 ] is negligible.
By the above arguments, we have that Pr[E * |E 1 ] is negligible. That is, the probability that player i obtains the secret when playing (
, which is noticeably less than U = σ i (σ), and thus the statement follows.
We can extend the construction of Theorem 2 to preserve higher immunity. Specifically, we provide a construction of an (n−m)-out-of-n secret-sharing protocol that preserves an (⌈ We can also provide a protocol that satisfies the property of S 3 in the above protocols. The protocol is a variant of the protocol given in [7] , and is constructed based on the same idea of using symmetric-key encryption and pseudorandom functions. See Appendix A.3 for the details.
Optimality of the Immune Protocols Regarding Coalition Resilience
Our robust protocols presented in Section 4.2 achieve the optimal coalition resilience. Specifically, we show that, for constant-round (r, m)-robust protocols, the coalition resilience r = ⌈ n 2 ⌉ − m − 1 is optimal. Also, if a protocol achieves a strict Nash equilibrium, 1-immunity is optimal.
First, we show that an (r, m)-robust protocol must have an (r + m)-coalition resilience. 
Then it follows from the definition of the payoff function for coalitions
, which implies that Π induces an (r + m)-resilient computational Nash equilibrium.
The next corollary immediately follows from the above theorem and the impossibility result of an ⌈ n 2 ⌉-resilient computational Nash equilibrium with constant-round reconstruction [2] . Next we show that it is difficult to achieve strict Nash equilibrium and high immunity simultaneously. Proof: Assume for the contradiction that the prescribed strategy σ of Π is 1-immune. Suppose that player 1 takes any strategy σ ′ 1 such that σ ′ 1 ̸ ∈ eq σ. Since σ is 1-immune, the payoff of player 2 when the players take the strategy (σ
, where ϵ(·) is a negligible function, which implies that player 2 can reconstruct the secret with probability at least 1 − ϵ ′ (k) for a negligible function ϵ ′ (·). Consider the strategy ρ 2 of player 2 such that player 2 follows σ 2 , and if the secret is reconstructed, then she broadcasts the secret. When the players follow the strategy (σ ′ 1 , ρ 2 , σ −{1,2} ), since player 1 can learn the secret with the same probability that player 2 can learn with, the payoff of player 1, namely,
, which implies that σ does not satisfy the first condition of (1, 1)-robust strict Nash equilibrium. Hence, the first statement follows. Furthermore, for the coalition C = {1, 2} we have
, which follows from the definition of payoff functions of coalitions. Since (σ ′ 1 , ρ 2 ) ̸ ∈ eq σ, this implies that σ does not induce a 2-resilient strict Nash equilibrium. Thus, the second statement follows.
The first statement of Theorem 4 asserts that Π cannot achieve a computational strict Nash equilibrium in the presence of a malicious player. The second statement of Theorem 4 asserts that if Π achieves immunity, then the coalition resilience of strict Nash equilibrium must be at most 1.
Since Π * induces m-immunity for a constant m ≥ 1, it follows from Theorem 4 that 1-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium is the maximum coalition resilience that we can hope for Π * .
Strict Nash Equilibrium and Stability With Respect to Trembles
In this section, we show that a strict Nash equilibrium implies a Nash equilibrium that is stable with respect to trembles. This means that strict Nash equilibrium is a strong solution concept that captures stability against any small deviation of other players. Intuitively, the reason for this fact is that any deviation with a noticeable probability yields a noticeable payoff loss by the strictness of the equilibrium, but the maximum payoff that can be recovered by the deviation is also bounded by some noticeable amount.
Theorem 5. If a secret-sharing protocol induces an r-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium, then it also induces an r-resilient computational Nash equilibrium that is stable with respect to trembles.
Proof: Let σ be a prescribed strategy of a secret-sharing protocol that induces an r-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium. Let C ⊂ N be any coalition with |C| ≤ r and ρ −C any PPT strategy for players in N \ C that is δ-close to σ −C for some noticeable function δ(·). We assume that ρ −C takes σ −C with probability 1 − δ andρ −C with probability δ. Let ρ C be any PPT strategy for the players in C. We show that there exists a PPT strategy σ ′ C ⊂ eq σ such that
. Specifically, we show it by letting σ ′ C = σ C . When ρ −C = σ −C , which occurs with probability 1 − δ, since σ is an r-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium, we have
where c 1 is some constant. When ρ −C =ρ −C , which occurs with probability δ, the maximum payoff C can increase by changing the strategy from σ C to ρ C is at most U + − U − . Thus,
The last inequality follows if we take δ = k −c 3 for sufficiently large c 3 . Therefore, the statement follows.
A Other Protocols
A.1 The t-out-of-n Protocol
A general t-out-of-n protocol for 3 ≤ t ≤ n is constructed as a simple generalization of the n-outof-n protocol. We employ a t-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 0 , a (⌊ t 2 ⌋ + 1)-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 1 , a ⌈ t 2 ⌉-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 2 , and a t-out-of-n rational secret-sharing protocol S 3 . The resulting protocol is an "exactly" tout-of-n secret-sharing protocol, which works under the assumption that exactly t players exist in the reconstruction phase. We also assume that the coalition is a subset of the players in the reconstruction phase.
Since the sharing phase protocol is the same as the n-out-of-n case, we describe the reconstruction phase protocol.
Reconstruction phase
Let M ⊆ N be the set of players in the reconstruction, where |M | = t. The players perform the following:
After all the players broadcasted their messages, if all the shares are valid, reconstruct µ from {w j } j∈M and go to the next round. Otherwise, halt and output a random string in {0, 1} ℓ .
• For all i ∈ M (in any order), send x i .
-After all the players broadcasted their messages, set M * to be the set of players j ∈ M who sent the valid share. If |M * | ≥ ⌊ • Perform the reconstruction protocol of S 3 by using z i to reconstruct s.
Then, halt and output s. The proof is quite similar to that of Theorem 1. We can also provide a general t-out-of-n protocol based on the same idea of [7] . Let Π t,n denote an exactly t-out-of-n protocol. In the general t-out-of-n protocol, the dealer prepares the shares of Π t,n , Π t+1,n , . . . , Π n,n . Then, in the reconstruction, the players perform the reconstruction protocol of Π t * ,n if there are t * players in the reconstruction. It follows from Theorem 6 that the resulting t-out-of-n protocol achieves a (⌈ t 2 ⌉ − 1)-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium.
A.2 The Protocol with Higher Immunity
We present a constant-round protocol with m-immunity based on any protocol with m-immunity for any constant m ≥ 1 that is independent of the security parameter k. The idea is a simple generalization of the 1-immune protocol presented in Section 4.2. If some set T of players with |T | ≤ m deviated in the protocol, then in the later rounds, the other players will broadcast their messages that are encrypted using symmetric-key encryption with a secret key that the players in T do not have. To implement this idea, we prepare 2 m keys for the deviations of any set of at most m players. Therefore, this protocol works if m is a constant independent of k. Our protocol employs a symmetric-key encryption scheme Π = (GenSKE, Enc, Dec), a family of pseudorandom functions F = {f sk : {0, 1} |sk| → {0, 1} |sk| } sk∈{0,1} * , an (n − m)-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 0 , an (⌊ n 2 ⌋ + 1)-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 1 , an ⌈ n 2 ⌉-out-of-n authenticated secret-sharing scheme S 2 , and an (n − m)-out-of-n rational secret-sharing protocol S 3 .
Sharing phase
• Generate a secret key sk SE T ← GenSKE(1 k ) for each T ∈ P m (N ), where P m (N ) is the family of all subsets of N of size at most m.
• Choose sk PRF T,j ∈ {0, 1} k uniformly at random for all T ∈ P m (N ) and j ∈ N \ T , and set η T = (sk SE T , {sk PRF T,j } j∈N \T ) for T ∈ P m (N ).
Reconstruction phase
-After all the players broadcasted their messages, set N * to be the set of players j ∈ N who sent the valid share, and set T * = N \ N * . -If |N * | ≥ n − m, reconstruct µ from (w 1 , . . . , w n ) and go to the next round. Otherwise, halt and output a random string in {0, 1} ℓ .
• For all i ∈ N * (in any order), if |N * | = n, send x i . (2) ).
-After all the players broadcasted their messages, if |N * | ̸ = n, then decrypt the received ciphertexts using the secret key sk SKE T * . Update N * to be the set of players j ∈ N * who sent the valid share, and T * to be N \ N * . If |N * | ≥ ⌊ n 2 ⌋ + 1, reconstruct s ′ from  (x 1 , . . . , x n ) . Otherwise, set s ′ to be a random string in {0, 1} ℓ .
-If |N * | ≥ n − m, go to the next round. Otherwise, halt and output s ′ ⊕ µ.
• For all i ∈ N * (in any order), if |N * | = n, send y i .
Otherwise The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.
A.3 The Protocol with Immunity Based on the Protocol of [7]
We present a protocol that satisfies the property of S 3 in Theorems 2 and 7. The protocol is based on the protocol of [7] . The idea for achieving immunity is almost the same as the protocols presented in Sections 4.2 and A.2. The protocol uses as building blocks two verifiable random functions (GenVRF, Eval, Prove, VerVRF) and (GenVRF ′ , Eval ′ , Prove ′ , VerVRF ′ ), a symmetric encryption scheme Π = (GenSKE, Enc, Dec), and a family of pseudorandom functions F = {f sk : {0, 1} |sk| → {0, 1} |sk| } sk∈{0,1} * .
Sharing phase
• Generate a secret key sk SE T ← GenSKE(1 k ) for each T ∈ P m (N ).
second condition of the robustness, namely, m-immunity. To prove the first condition, we show that even if players in T with |T | ≤ m take any strategy, the payoff of any coalition C ⊆ N with |C| ≤ n − m − 1 does not increase under the assumption that the players in N \ (C ∪ T ) follow the protocol. The case that the payoff of C is strictly larger than U is that C learns the secret, but players in N \ C do not. This situation can be achieved only if the coalition C successfully predicts the "real" round r * . The coalition has at most m + 1 trials to predict r * since the protocol induces m-immunity. Since r * is chosen according to a geometric distribution, the probability of being the real round is the same in any round before the real one. Therefore, the expected payoff of C greater than that of the protocol without immunity (namely, the original protocol of [7] ) is at most m · U + . Hence, if we choose β to satisfy that U > β · (m + 1) · U + + (1 − β) · U − (the condition on β in the protocol of [7] is the case m = 0), then the expected payoff of C does not increase. We can choose such β if m is a constant independent of the payoff. Next we prove that the protocol induces a 1-resilient computational strict Nash equilibrium. If a player deviated, the player cannot understand the message exchanged in the later rounds since they are encrypted, and thus the player cannot learn the secret. (A formal proof follows in a similar way to Claim 1.) Therefore, a single deviation decreases the payoff by a noticeable amount.
